There you have Bush (as candidate for president) telling Prince Bandar: "I don’t have the foggiest idea about what I think about international, foreign policy." (p. 3). There was a reference about Bandar establishing friendships around the world including with leaders in Israel (p. 4). Bush telling Rice "I don’t have any idea about foreign affairs." (p. 6); that same man is now running the world, and wanting to restructure the Middle East.
If only the American people, especially those who voted for him, would see the tragic ironies in those admissions. How little American voters ask of their leaders, especially–ironically–when they run for the presidency. There was a scene in which Bandar was informing Bush about the impressions of "the Arab minds." (p. 46). And this advocate of "democracy" and "liberty"–Bush that is–telling Prince Bandar that "Let me make one thing clear up front: nothing should ever break the relationship between us."(p. 76). No matter how many violations of human rights are perpetrated by House of Saud.
On p. 80 there was a reference to a casual conversation between Bush and Bandar in which the former initiates casually the notorious rendition policy: "If we get somebody and we can’t get them to cooperate, we’ll hand them over to you." And then you read about the special secret group that Wolfowitz at the Pentagon formed to advise the US government "well into the Afghanistan bombing campaign." The elite group included such luminaries as Bernard Lewis (he probably regaled them with his numerological predications), Fareed Zakaria, Fouad Ajami, James Q. Wilson, Reuel Marc Gerecht, etc. You get the idea. If those were advising the government on the Middle East and Islam, you know what to expect. They produced a secret document, says Woodward, which had the "insights" that you read in Friedman’s columns (I wonder why he was not included), the bunk about the civil war within Islam. They basically urged the government to go to war against Iraq, concluding that such a war is "inevitable." (p. 84). In the Iraq war (as it was being planned, Bush saw a "public relations opportunity" (p. 107) in the Arab world. You learn that Gen. Abizaid was picked for his command position because he knew "the Arab mind so well." (p. 116).
And then the US government got busy: a search was under way. Rumsfeld issued orders: "[f]ind Iraq’s Hamid Karzai." (p. 131). Bandar then advised Bush and Rice to retain Saddam’s intelligence service: "Look, their intel service was the most efficient."(p. 163) On p. 167, you learn that when US officials (in preparation for the war) talked about Iraqis, they meant Iraqi exiles; and when they talked about Iraqi exiles, they meant Ahmad Chalabi. On p. 187, you learn that the White House lied when it claimed that it had nothing to do with the Mission Accomplished sign; in fact, it was in the original speech by Bush, but Rumsfeld removed it on time. Bremer, upon assuming his responsibilities in Baghdad bragged: "I am the Iraqi government for now."(p. 199). If this is not "liberation" what is?
The US officials thought that Shaykh Qazwini is "a leading cleric" (p. 222). They never heard of Sistani until the war. And Cheney was so involved in the search for WMDs that he would send location tips: he "seemed to have a conviction that something had gone to Lebanon’s Bekaa Valley".(p. 238) In a meeting with Bush, he asked: "Do we have the communications strategy to be able to run with AlJazeera"? Bush asked. We have a network. We’re using it," someone said. "We should–Do we have the communications network?" Bush asked. "Yes," someone said again. "We have our network, and we’re also trying to use AlJazeera and Al Arabiya to the extent we can."
