War Post

MapsofWar.com, via here.

In an interview with the Daily Mail, Sir Richard Dannatt said "we must quit Iraq soon." 

"We are in a Muslim country and Muslims’ views of foreigners in their country are quite clear."

"The military campaign we fought in 2003 effectively kicked the door in. Whatever consent we may have had in the first place, may have turned to tolerance and has largely turned to intolerance."

"That is a fact. I don’t say that the difficulties we are experiencing round the world are caused by our presence in Iraq but undoubtedly our presence in Iraq exacerbates them."

In comments that set him at loggerheads with Mr Blair, Gen Dannatt warns that the good intentions of 2003 have long since evaporated - pitching British troops into a lethal battle that few at home can understand.

"I think history will show that the planning for what happened after the initial successful war fighting phase was poor, probably based more on optimism than sound planning," he said.

"The original intention was that we put in place a liberal democracy that was an exemplar for the region, was pro West and might have a beneficial effect on the balance within the Middle East."

"That was the hope, whether that was a sensible or naïve hope history will judge. I don’t think we are going to do that. I think we should aim for a lower ambition."

The Daily Mail writes that the General also "understands why Prince William and Prince Harry want to serve on the frontline but has not yet decided whether they will be allowed to fight in Afghanistan."

The death toll among Iraqis as a result of the US-led invasion has now reached an estimated 655,000, a study in the Lancet medical journal reports today. The figure for the number of deaths attributable to the conflict - which amounts to around 2.5% of the population - is at odds with figures cited by the US and UK governments and will cause a storm, but the Lancet says the work, from the Johns Hopkins Bloomberg School of Public Health in Baltimore, has been examined and validated by four separate independent experts who all urged publication.

"I need someone to protect me from all the measures they take in order to protect me." England, London I think.

Via the "art terrorist" Banksy.

In the pressing search for Arabic speakers, the military has turned to Middle Eastern immigrants in the United States. Sergeant Murad is a rising star in this effort. He has recruited 10 men to the program in little more than a year, a record unrivaled in the Army National Guard.

Still, he is an unlikely foot soldier in the campaign. His own evolution — from a teenage immigrant who landed in North Dakota after the first gulf war to a spit-and-polish sergeant — has been marked with private suffering.

In boot camp, he was called a “raghead.” Comrades have questioned his patriotism. Last year a staff sergeant greeted him by calling out, “Here comes the Taliban!”

He remembers a day in 2002 when the comedian Drew Carey visited a base in Saudi Arabia where he was working. During a skit, Sergeant Murad recalled, Mr. Carey dropped to the ground to mimic the Muslim prayer. As the troops roared with laughter, Sergeant Murad walked out.

“I thought about my mom when she prays, how humble she is,” he said.

Yet, day after day, Sergeant Murad sets out to sell other immigrants on the life he has lived. He believes that Muslims need the military more than ever, he said: At a time when many feel alienated, it offers them a path to assimilation, a way to become undeniably American.

Calling all those who will be watching this tomorrow at their schools–Guantanomo: How Should We Respond?–please do find time to post comments. I will too. 

There you have Bush (as candidate for president) telling Prince Bandar: "I don’t have the foggiest idea about what I think about international, foreign policy." (p. 3). There was a reference about Bandar establishing friendships around the world including with leaders in Israel (p. 4). Bush telling Rice "I don’t have any idea about foreign affairs." (p. 6); that same man is now running the world, and wanting to restructure the Middle East.

 If only the American people, especially those who voted for him, would see the tragic ironies in those admissions. How little American voters ask of their leaders, especially–ironically–when they run for the presidency. There was a scene in which Bandar was informing Bush about the impressions of "the Arab minds." (p. 46). And this advocate of "democracy" and "liberty"–Bush that is–telling Prince Bandar that "Let me make one thing clear up front: nothing should ever break the relationship between us."(p. 76). No matter how many violations of human rights are perpetrated by House of Saud.

On p. 80 there was a reference to a casual conversation between Bush and Bandar in which the former initiates casually the notorious rendition policy: "If we get somebody and we can’t get them to cooperate, we’ll hand them over to you." And then you read about the special secret group that Wolfowitz at the Pentagon formed to advise the US government "well into the Afghanistan bombing campaign." The elite group included such luminaries as Bernard Lewis (he probably regaled them with his numerological predications), Fareed Zakaria, Fouad Ajami, James Q. Wilson, Reuel Marc Gerecht, etc. You get the idea. If those were advising the government on the Middle East and Islam, you know what to expect. They produced a secret document, says Woodward, which had the "insights" that you read in Friedman’s columns (I wonder why he was not included), the bunk about the civil war within Islam. They basically urged the government to go to war against Iraq, concluding that such a war is "inevitable." (p. 84). In the Iraq war (as it was being planned, Bush saw a "public relations opportunity" (p. 107) in the Arab world. You learn that Gen. Abizaid was picked for his command position because he knew "the Arab mind so well." (p. 116).

And then the US government got busy: a search was under way. Rumsfeld issued orders: "[f]ind Iraq’s Hamid Karzai." (p. 131). Bandar then advised Bush and Rice to retain Saddam’s intelligence service: "Look, their intel service was the most efficient."(p. 163) On p. 167, you learn that when US officials (in preparation for the war) talked about Iraqis, they meant Iraqi exiles; and when they talked about Iraqi exiles, they meant Ahmad Chalabi. On p. 187, you learn that the White House lied when it claimed that it had nothing to do with the Mission Accomplished sign; in fact, it was in the original speech by Bush, but Rumsfeld removed it on time. Bremer, upon assuming his responsibilities in Baghdad bragged: "I am the Iraqi government for now."(p. 199). If this is not "liberation" what is?

The US officials thought that Shaykh Qazwini is "a leading cleric" (p. 222). They never heard of Sistani until the war. And Cheney was so involved in the search for WMDs that he would send location tips: he "seemed to have a conviction that something had gone to Lebanon’s Bekaa Valley".(p. 238) In a meeting with Bush, he asked: "Do we have the communications strategy to be able to run with AlJazeera"? Bush asked. We have a network. We’re using it," someone said. "We should–Do we have the communications network?" Bush asked. "Yes," someone said again. "We have our network, and we’re also trying to use AlJazeera and Al Arabiya to the extent we can."

 Via the Angry Arab News Service.